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In 1977 Walter Ulrich identified an increasing 
interest in the use of the counterplan in intercollegi-
1 
ate debate. This trend is somewhat surprising in light 
17 
of the virtual absence of any generally accepted counter-
plan theory with the debate community. In 1951 Harold 
E. Wisner reviewed what he considered to be the twelve 
most important debate texts, hoping to find a consensus 
on the effect of the burden of proof on judging counter-
plans. He found six of the texts to be indefinite, and 
the remaining six to be split on the question of who has 
2 the greater burden. Attempting to determine whether or 
not there was confusion on the same question, Wayne N. 
Thompson performed a similar survey in 1962. He reviewed 
what he considered to be the six major argumentation texts 
and five others he considered less important. Thompson 
found none of the texts to be complete or definite. 3 
In 1974 Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer 
criticized the traditional concept of presumption as 
providing no guidance for judging counterplans. Later they 
indicted traditional theory as assigning arbitrary and con-
fusing criteria to stock issues, and as providing no 
criteria from which to choose competing policy systems. 4 
Ulrich noted that, prior to 1972, the articles that did 
18 
discuss counterplans provided only limited application of 
theory. Since 1972, only specific issues have been 
addressed; thus theory has been discussed by debaters large-
1 d h b . 5 y on an a oc as1s. 
A great deal of debate literature has appeared in the 
last fifteen ye~rs. Little emphasis has been placed on the 
area of counterplan theory, yet the texts consistently have 
included some discussion. This paper expands the Wisner 
and subsequent Thompson studies, providing a review of 
relevant criteria. Those concepts, evident throughout the 
available literature, which are important as criteria to 
judge thecounterplan are identified. Although other con-
cepts are discussed, the natural division seems to be into 
three categories: 1) presumption, 2) burden of proof, 
and 3) competitiveness. This review focuses on these 
three areas. 
A synthesis of the existing concepts of the counterplan 
is · important in clarifying the responsibilities of a negative 
team choosing such a strategy. Thompson contended that such 
a clarification is an important value in itself. He further 
argued that eliminating confusion will allow better debating; 
debaters should not argue over procedural technicalities. 6 
Ulrich noted that since not all judges are likely to 
agree on a single theory of the counterplan, debaters will 
have to discuss these concepts in debate rounds. In fact, 
he encouraged this practice, but he argued that the debaters 
should have an understanding of the important concepts. 
This is true for both affirmative and negative teams, 
7 
since theory may also be used to refute the counterplan. 
Whether or not auniversally accepted theory of the 
counterplan can avoid debate over theoretical problems, 
and whether that is desirable, is yet to be seen and is 
not the subject of _ this study. Nevertheless, with or 
without debate over theory, a basic understanding and 
awareness of the underlying concepts is important. 
Neither goal can be achieved without a basic knowledge of 
the existing thought in the field. This paper examines 
the existing thought evident in debate literature. 
A THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE COUNTERPLAN 
Traditional theorists have consistently warned nega-
tives of the dangers of adopting a counterplan strategy. 
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It often has been called risky, since the negative assumes 
a burden of proof and abandons presumption. The counter-
plan often is called the most radical negative approach. 
John Pacilio, Jr. and William H. Stites advised students 
to "simply avoid its use." 8 James C. McCrosky warned that 
many judges dislike counterplans, and that the inexperienc-
9 
ed judge may not understand the concept. Roy V. Wood felt 
that the counterplan admitted the need, and some judges find 
that reason enough to vote affirmative. Most judges are 
20 
biased against the counterplan, and many consider it a 
10 trick strategy. Although he later seemed to change his 
view, in 1944 Wayne N. Thompson did not consider the 
counterplan a legitimate strategy. He argued that such a 
strategy makes a debate multilateral and damages the 
ability to thoroughly test a single solution. The counter-
plan creates confusion, decreases the time available for 
each specific po~icy, and prevents direct clash. Thompson 
contended that a negative supporting a counterplan does 
. d' h k f h . . 1 1' 11 not 1n 1ct t e wea ness o t e or1g1na po 1cy. 
Despite these criticisms, traditional theorists general-
ly have recognized the counterplan as a legitimate strategy 
in unique circumstances. George W. Zieglemueller and Charles 
A. Dause suggested that strong counterplans are rare due to 
the nature of debate resolutions. 12 Arthur N. Kruger con-
tended that only in unique situations is a presumption for 
change warranted; thus, few propositions are chosen that 
13 
actually offer the choice of a counterplan. Nevertheless, 
a counterplan may be relevant to any policy resolution, when 
the status quo is not easily defended. Most of the traditional 
theorists agree that a counterplan is legitimate if the nega-
tive is unable to defend the present system. Kruger implied 
that the negative may choose a counterplan strategy if both 
teams agree on the intended end or goal of the system, but 
differ on the most effective means to reach that end. 14 
Traditional Bases 
Traditional theory supports the counterplan through 
real world analogies. The most often cited are the legal 
analogy and the closely related parliamentary and legis-
lative analogies. A good example of the legal analogy 
was provided by James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and 
Glen E. Mills: 
Suppose in the burglary case ... , instead of 
confining its case to proving unfounded one or 
more of the five accusations, the defense simply 
denies them all and offers evidence that proves 
conclusively that not A, the accused, but X, 
committed the crime in question.lS 
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This situation often is referred to as taking an affirmative 
defense. Many of the authors, thus, considered the negative 
supporting a counterplan to be, in essence, an affirmative 
plan, and should be equally as detailed. 16 A major change 
in the second edition of George McCoy Musgrave's Competitive 
Debate was the contention that both affirmative and negative 
teams offering plans should provide significant description 
h 11 d d h ld b 'd d 17 w en ca e upon to o so. Vagueness s ou e avo1 e . 
Another analogy frequently made to the counterplan is 
the legislative one. Henry Lee Eubank and J. Jeffery Auer 
provided an example: 
The negative may admit the existance of a serious 
problem, but argue that the affirmative is advocat-
ing the wrong solution. This position is often taken 
by the opposition in legislative and political debates. 
For example, both major parties believe something should 
be done for the farmer, but each has its own farm pro-
grams and each fears the worst should the opposition's 
plan be adopted.l8 
Musgrave then suggested that a counterplan which would 
be relevant in a legislative context may be proposed. 19 
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According to Musgrave the "ideal counterplan" was dif-
frent in principle from the affirmative plan, and "gives 
sufficient grounds for rejecting the affirmative proposal." 
He warned, however, that ideal counterplans were rare, and 
thus a strict rule allowing only counterplans that would be 
acceptable in legislative assemblies should be enforced. 
If the counterplan was very similar to the affirmative plan, 
it could only be considered if the difference was shown to 
be so important as to provide a reason to reject the plan 
in favor of the counterplan. Surprise in legislative sit-
uations was acceptable, thus counterplans used for the 
effect of surprise were acceptable, just as "facetious 
and irrelevant" counterplans were out of order. Just as 
in legislative practice, "disputed matter is admitted if 
there is doubt as to its admissibility." 20 
Another analogy close in concept to the legislative 
example is the parliamentary example. A motion to sub-
stitute is seen as the counterpart to a counterplan. such 
a motion attempts to substitute itself for, or amend, the 
motion originally being debated in parliamentary procedure. 
Since an equal vote for and against a substitute motion 
resulted in its defeat, Thompson reasoned that a counter-
plan found equal in merit to an affirmative plan was 
defeated. 21 In addition, the new motion must address the 
the same questions as the original bill: 
To be germane, an amendment must in some way 
involve the same question that is raised by the 
motion to which it is applied.22 
23 
Based on this rule, it has been reasoned that counterplans 
should address the same issue or deal with the same problem 
area as the affirmative plan. 23 
Systems Analysis 
A modern innovation in debate theory was the model in-
corporating General Systems Theory and public policy analysis. 
This "judging paradigm," known as systems analysis has become 
extremely popular in the debate community. In a 1973 work, 
Bernard Brock, James Chesebro, John Cragan, and James Klumpp 
articulated the concept and its implications for academic 
24 debate. It is not the purpose of this paper to explore 
the model in detail; instead, its implications for counter-
plan theory are discussed. 
Systems analysis viewed academic debate as a type of 
public policy analysis. It recognized complex interaction 
of systems and sub-systems, multiple causation, and the 
constantly changing nature of systems and policy. In 
systems analysis debate, two consistent policy proposals 
were compared as to relative merit by the use of cost 
benefit analysis. It was imperative in systems analysis 
debate that the negative team, as well as the affirmative 
defend a coherent system for comparison. This emphasis 
24 
gave increased importance to the counterplan as a negative 
strategy: 
In addition to eliminating status quo 
revisions as a viable negative position, the 
necessity to compare influences the other three 
positions as well. Direct refutation becomes 
less important, because with this strategy the 
negative does not defend a specific system. 
Defense of the status quo 1s awkward, unless 
the negative specifies precisely what it means 
by status quo and defends this system. Counter-
proposal becomes more acceptable, because this 
stand represents a comparison of systems. 
Increased emphasis upon comparison will 
force the negative either to defend the present 
policy as a system or recommend a substitute 
system, a counterproposal.25 
The counterplan, then, was a logical negative system. Brock 
et al felt that a counterplan acquired a burden of proof, but 
its measurement was unclear. They objected to the ambiguous 
position of supporting the status quo and major changes, the 
latter assuming a burden of proof. Thus, the counterplan, as 
a concrete position, was superior for the purposes of comparison. 
Systems analysis viewed the status quo as constantly in 
flux. Thus, unlike the traditional perspective which expected 
a negative denial of the need for change and considered repairs 
and counterplans unusual, systems analysis called for a 
negative position developed to cope with change. Traditional 
I 
views that "such negative positions are somehow not as 'important 
as the negative denial of a need for change," were altered by 
system's concepts: 
As we introduce systemic analysis into 
affirmative debating, this traditional perspec-
tive changes, and changes rather drastically. 
Instead of viewing the first affirmative speech 
as a complete statement of position, the first 
affirmative speech is viewed as only the first 
assertion for one system of change which will be 
denied by a counterassertion for a different 
system of change. The negative counterassertions 
may vary greatly. Many negative counterassertions 
will clearly assume that drastic changes are 
appropriate (perhaps a counterplan) . 
Given the assumption that change is ever-
present, the negative counterassertion must include 
a system for dealing with change as well as insur-
ing that the negative set of changes preclude the 
significance and responsiveness of the affirmative 
system for change (the debate resolution) . From a 
systemic point of view, then, the 2gegative pos-ture will include a "new" system. 
Counterplans then assumed constant change and countered 
the resolution as defined by the affirmative proposal. 
25 
Systems analysis, since it focused on issues of public 
policy decision-making, emphasized the legislative analogy: 
The public debate over medicare illustrates how 
the legislative process modifies the traditional 
negative stands and forces debaters to defend a 
system. Initially, the negative (led by the 
American Medical Association) responded to the 
King-Anderson Bill, medical care for the aged 
administered through Social Security, by arguing 
that there simply was no need for it--defense of 
the present system. However, as debate progressed 
and they apparently were losing, the AMA was forced 
to support a specific change as a counterproposal, 
the Kerr-Mills-AMA alternative to the King-Anderson 
Bill . . . the point is that in legislative debate 
the important issue is "which alternative is the 
most desirable one?" 27 
26 
The most important implication of the analogy was the re-
quirement of both sides to support a consistent position as 
defined by a specific, coherent policy system. As already 
seen, this idea encouraged use of the counterplan. 
Brock et al. assumed that the negative, in supporting 
their policy system, assumed the "same responsibilities as 
the affirmative tearn." 28 They warned negatives that a 
strategy of supporting repairs increased the negative burden 
of proof to be equal to that of the affirmative. 29 It was 
unclear whether this same rule applied to presentation of 
a counterplan. The systems view of presumption was the idea 
that "he who asserts must prove." Because of inertia (it 
takes energy, or effort, to change policies), some presumption 
was assigned to present policies. This presumption wa? passive 
d t · 'f' t 11 30 It 1 · t h re an no s1gn1 1can overa . was unc ear JUS ow P -
sentation of a counterplan affected presumption. 
In summary, systems analysis granted increased importance 
to the counterplan. Due to its emphasis on policy comparison, 
its recognition of constant change, and use of the legis-
lative analogy, systems analysis provided a sound theoretical 
basis for the counterplan. Competing policies were measured 
relative to each ~ther by use of cost benefit analysis. 
Criteria of presumption, burden of proof, and competitiveness 
were unclear, although the counterplan, or negative system, 
had to preclude the effectiveness of the affirmative system. 
27 
Hypothesis-Testing 
Another recent innovation in debate theory is the 
hypothesis-testing paradigm as advanced by David Zarefsky. 
This model viewed academic debate as analogous to the 
method of scientific inquiry. The affirmative proposition 
was parallel to the researcher's hypothesis in statistical 
analysis; it was a yes/no question to be answered as 
probably true or probably false. The hypothesis should 
be rigorously tested against all possible alternatives. 
The counterplan, then, was a null hypothesis to be weighed 
against the original question. 
In a 1976 paper, Zarefsky discussed six of the im-
plications the hypothesis-testing paradigm had for academic 
debate. First,the wording of the proposition was more 
important than specific plan wording. The goal of debate 
is only to answer a question; nothing was actually adopted. 
The plan should only illustrate the principles of the resolu~ 
tion; a legislative bill was unnecessary. Debate about 
specific plan issues was hypothetical in nature. The word-
ing of the resolution was critical, and of importance in 
defining alternative hypotheses, or counterplans: 
By contrast, the wording of the proposition is 
of central importance, since the proposition is 
the hypothesis being put to the test. Any different 
statement of a proposition assumes the character of 
an alternate hypothesis.31 
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Thus, to be competitive, the counterplan must be different 
from the proposition in principle. The main question was 
whether the affirmative could justify the proposition: 
In order for proposition X to withstand the 
challenge that alternate hypothesis Y could 
account equally well for the phenomena being 
discussed, a specific defense must be made for 
proposition x--not just for "a change" or even 
for a direction in which change should proceed. 
Hence the genre of "justification" arguments is 
of special significance.32 
The counterplan, as an alternate hypothesis, attempted to 
provide an alternate explanation, denying the affirmative 
justification. 
A second implication of hypothesis-testing was the idea 
that presumption always rested against the resolution, since 
the hypothesis was assumed false until other reasonable ex-
planations could be rejected. Negatives always retained 
presumption; thus, distinctions between minor repairs and 
counterplans were irrelevant. Only by advocating the 
affirmative hypothesis could the negative lose the advantage 
f t . 33 o presump 1on. 
The third and fourth implications deal with fiat power 
and inherency and are of little importance to counterplan 
theory. 
The fifth set of implications discussed deals with the 
counterplan speGifically. Just as plans are not adopted by 
warrant -of affirm~tive decisions, counterplans are conditional, 
and would not be adopted. Rejection of the resolution did not 
require endorsement of the alternative. Counterplans question-
ed the affirmative justification: 
The function of the counterplan is to argue 
that the specific proposition under consideration 
has not been justified. How can proposition X be 
said to be warranted if alternative proposition 
Y accounts for the data equally well?34 
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Thus, the counterplan was a type of conditional justification 
agreement. To present a counterplan was not to admit the 
affirmative problem area, but only to show the failure of the 
affirmative to provide justification to believe the truth of 
the resolution. Presumption was retained by the negative 
proposing a counterplan, since the proposition was presumed 
false. Legislative specificity was not necessary; the 
negative must only "claim that action based on principles 
incompatible with the principles of the proposition would be 
an equally appropriate way to deal with a given problem." 35 
The final implication made by Zaretsky was concerned 
with the nature of the judge's decision. The question did 
not deal with "this -versus-that," but rather was a "yes or 
'' d 
. . 36 
no ec1s1on. In summary, hypothesis-testing viewed the 
counterplan as an alternate hypothesis. It was conditional, 
challenged the affirmative justification of the proposition, 
and retained presumption. 
Summary 
The counterplan, given certain situations, is generally 
accepted as theoretically sound. Traditional theorists 
supported the counterplan as analogous to various legal 
settings, legislative activity, and parliamentary procedure. 
The systems analysis paradigm encouraged the counterplan 
as a competing policy for comparative policy analysis. 
The hypothesis-testing model view the counterplan as an 
alternate hypothesis, against which to test the probable 
truth of the resolution. 
THE NATURE OF JUDGING CRITERIA 
30 
The counterplan is well supported as a sound negative 
approach in debate. Yet, there is little consensus on the 
necessary criteria for judging the counterplan. A greater 
understanding of the tools used for measurement and evalua-
tion of argumentation is critical to a greater understanding 
of theory and to more effective practice. The most important 
concepts, identified by most authors and addressed specifi-
cally in this treatment, are presumption, burden of proof, 
and competitiveness. These terms are defined briefly and 
then examined in relation to the counterplan. Finally, some 
other relevant decision rules are discussed. 
Presumption 
Lichtman and Rohrer indicated that a presumption is a 
prejudgment made in favor of a given side. 37 The traditional 
concept of presumption is derived from Archbishop Richard 
Whately's definition of presumption as a "preoccupation of 
the ground." This implied not necessarily that an existing 
institution is good, but that it will stand until some 
sufficient reason is presented to change or remove that 
31 
institution. This concept is drawn from the legal analogy 
to presumption of innocence. A person is assumed to be 
innocent until sufficient proof is raised against him. 38 
Although this is the predominant view of presumption, others 
have been forwarded. Most theorists contended that the 
negative supporting a counterplan abandons presumption, 
yet this is not universal, and there is no agreement on 
what does happen to presumption in the case of a counter-
plan. Two views that are relevant to a discussion of 
counterplans are those preceptions of presumption within 
the hypothesis-testing model and those advanced by Lichtman 
and Rohrer in their "risk" theory. These concepts are 
identified later where they are relevant. 
Of the texts reviewed, only five specifically mentioned 
presumption. All five indicated a loss of the advantage of 
presumption by a negative team offering a counterplan. Capp, 
Dick, Wood, and Zieglemueller all indicated a negative loss 
of presumption. None clarified where presumption then lies, 
l'f l't d t . t 39 or cease o ex1s . O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales 
in 1917, explained that a negative offering a counterplan 
became an affirmative; thus there were two propositions at 
d . . d 40 once, an no presumpt1on ex1ste . 
Ulrich noted that according to traditional theory in 
general, the negative abandoned presumption to the affirmative 
when offering a counterplan. This was supported by the parlia-
mentary model. When offering a motion to substitute, a 
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majority vote was required. Thus a tie meant the sub-
stitute motion failed, and the original motion was weighed 
on its merits. By analogy, the counterplan failed in a 
tie, so the affirmative had presumption. The legal analogy 
also was relevant. When a defendant pleaded guilty but 
offered an affirmative defense, presumption usually shifted. 
Thus, if a counterplan was analogous to an affirmative 
defense, presumption in debate also would shift. 41 Wisner 
agreed that the arrirmative gained presumption, but offered 
different support. He argued that the affirmative should 
have the advantage of presumption when the negative did the 
unexpected. This argument is based on practical reasons. 
First, when the negative chose to introduce a counterplan, 
they had an advantage in preparation; and second, since 
f . t ff. . . . d 42 1rs a 1rmat1ve construct1ve t1me was waste . 
Nebergall offered an interesting analysis. He first 
criticized the legislative analogy. Legislators, given the 
opportunity to vote on two conflicting policies, had other 
options. They could attempt to amend either bill, or vote 
against both policies and retain the status quo. Since 
there was no such choice in debate, the analogy was invalid. 
The legal analogy was no more applicable. An accused person 
either was guilty or not guilty. His guilt was a question 
of fact. This fact could be disproved by proof of a contrary 
fact; someone else committed the crime. This did not apply 
33 
to a question of policy. Existence of a good policy did 
not prove that another policy, even a contradictory one, 
was bad. Nebergall suggested that even if the counterplan 
was not proven to be superior to the affirmative plan, the 
affirmative must overcome presumption to win. Thus, in a 
h . . d . 43 manner, t e negat1ve reta1ne presumpt1on. 
Lichtman and Rohrer advised that decision rules should 
determine presumption based on the unique circumstances of 
the matter under consideration. They offered five bases for 
determining which policy incurred the greater risk: (1) the 
degree of deviation suggested, (2) the value of the policies 
disturbed, (3) the status of the present system, (4) the 
reversability of the change, and (5) the quality of informa-
tion available. Presumption was assigned to the policy 
. . h 1 . k b d h . . 44 1mpos1ng t e east r1s ase on t ese cr1ter1a. 
Hypothesis Testing offered another view of presumption. 
According to this theory, the resolution was analogous to a 
scientific hypothesis, assumed to be false. Since the 
resolution was presumed false until proven otherwise, pre-
sumption always was against the resolution. This theory 
implied that the affirmative must offer the best possible 
I 
policy. An affirmative vote locked the system to a specific 
policy; a negative vote kept all alternatives open. Thus, the 
negative supporting anything other than the resolution re-
. d . 45 ta1ne presumpt1on. 
When presumption is considered in relation to the 
counterplan, it was usually assumed that the negative abandoned 
34 
its advantage of presumption upon presentation of a counter-
plan. This was probably based on the traditional concept of 
presumption in favor of existing institutions. Recent studies 
have shown that the concept of presumption established in 
debate literature is similarly reflected in actual practice. 46 
Burden of Proof 
Closely related to the concept of presumption is the 
burden of proof. According to Whately's theory, the burden 
of proof lies with the side attempting to overturn presump-
t . 47 1on. Lichtman and Rohrer argue that it is harmful to 
link presumption and burden of proof. Rather, they would 
contend that "he who asserts must prove" is a more accurate 
d . . 48 escr1pt1on. The variation in counterplan theory concern-
ing the burden of proof is quite simple and clearly bilateral-
ly divided. One group contends that the negative must prove 
their counterplan superior to the affirmative plan; the other 
contingent supposes that a counterplan equal in merit to the 
affirmative plan warrants rejection of the resolution. This 
might seem a minor distinction; the possibility of a situa-
tion where plan and counterplan provide equal merits being 
small. Yet, this question is basic to an understanding of 
counterplan theory, and an important distinction in judging 
criteria. It is central to the purpose of policy comparison. 
Are we to choose the best policy, or test the merits of a 
single policy? 
35 
The traditional theorists agreed, almost universally, 
that a counterplan carried a greater burden of proof than 
the affirmative plan. The most common statement was that 
the negative proposing a counterplan assumed A burden of 
proof while the affirmative retained THE burden of proof. 
Zieglemueller clarified by indicating that the negative 
49 
assumed an equal but distinct burden of proof. The 
affirmative must meet their burden, and, if they failed. 
they lost, regardless. The negative, on the other hand, 
must prove their plan to be superior to the affirmative 
plan, according to fourteen of seventeen texts addressing 
the issue. 50 As mentioned earlier, Thompson provided support 
with the parliamentary analogy. A substitutive motion fail-
ed if the vote was tied; thus, the superiority of the counter-
1 t d th . . t t 51 p an represen e e maJOr1 y vo e. 
In 1976, Austin J. Freeley revised his text for its 
fourth edition. Although previous editions had maintained 
the position that a successful counterplan must be superior 
to the affirmative plan, in the revised fourth edition, he 
stated that, if the counterplan was equally as desirable as 
the affirmative, then the affirmative had failed to meet 
its burden. 52 McBurney and Mills indicated that the affirma-
tive must prove its plan is the best solution, and thus, a 
counterplan equal in merit to the affirmative plan would 
. ld . . . f h 1 . 53 requ1re wou requ1re re]ect1on o t e reso ut1on. In 
his later text, Mills defined the burden of proof to be 
36 
"logical and ethical responsibility adequate to affirm any 
assertion which turns out to be controversial." Based on 
this definition, and assigning the burden to the affirmative 
first, he suggested that the affirmative must . "preponderate" 
while the negative need only "balance." 54 Hypothesis test-
ing required that the affirmative assume a greater burden, 
and risk theory assigned the burden based on the nature of 
the changes proposed. The team with the greater degree of 
risk, based on the previously mentioned criteria, lost 
presumption. 
Musgrave recognized views contrary to his. Some argued 
that since a counterplan may be difficult to distinguish from 
the status quo with repairs, the affirmative always should 
have the burden to prove its policy superior. Musgrave con-
tended this was absurd, since it was quite easy to distinguish 
55 the status quo from a counterplan. 
Competitiveness 
Finally, the question of competitiveness is important. 
All agree that a c:ounterplan must compete with the affirmative; 
that it, in fact, be counter. However, theorists differ on 
what constitutes competitiveness. Some argue that the 
advantages or need areas of each respective plan compete. 
Others feel that preclusion of simultaneous adoption equals 
competition. Clearly, this question is vital to a clearer 
understanding of the criteria for judging the counterplan. 
37 
Ulrich contended that competitiveness was the most vital 
but least understood criterion of judging the counterplan. 
He suggested that traditional theorists required a counter-
plan to accrue the affirmative advantage, or solve its need 
area, in order to be competitive. This concept probably is 
derived from the parliamentary analogy. To amend a motion 
by substitution, the second bill must deal with the same 
problem area the original bill did. Thus, even a superior 
counterplan, according to this theory, would be rejected 
if it did not meet the affirmative's need. 56 This conten-
tion is backed up by a review of the literature. Of twenty-
three texts that spoke to the subject, twenty-one required 
the counterplan to meet the affirmative need. Three of five 
journal articles making advocative statements indicated the 
need of the counterplan to solve the affirmative problem 
57 
area. 
Of the texts requiring solvency of the affirmative need, 
Bauer, Terry, and Thompson allowed the negative to develop a 
new need area in addition to the affirmative one. Bauer 
warned, however, that this practice may result in the 
uncertain contrast of irrelevant poliqies and problems. 
Freeley and Pacilio suggested that instead of meeting the 
affirmative's need as stated, the negative could redefine 
the problem, then provide a new proposal. Several authors 
noted the negative's option to differ on the causes of the 
stated need. Bauer and Wood allowed a re-analysis, but 
required accrual of the specific affirmative advantage. 
Finally, Terry suggested that the negative should solve 
the problem area cited by the affirmative team, but that 
they could offer conflicting values within the same pro-
58 blem area. 
38 
Lichtman and Rohrer criticized this traditional point 
of view. They contended that while decision theory implied 
competitiveness, traditional theory only required another 
means to solve the same problem area. Thus, they argued 
that while two plans could work together effectively, 
traditional theory would not allow adoption of both. 59 
Ulrich contended that the emphasis has shifted from com-
60 petitiveness of the need area to the nature of the plans. 
This assertion seemed somewhat questionable, since thirteen 
of the texts reviewed, including one published in 1917, 
required plan incompatibility. Four of the five journal 
articles also required plan competitiveness. Of the texts, 
six provided the test of mutual exclusivity to determine 
competitiveness. If simultaneous adoption of the counter-
plan and the plan was possible, then the counterplan was to 
be rejected, or rather, simply incorporated into the 
affirmative proposal. Ziegelmueller suggested that the 
counterplan must be structurally and philosophically 
inconsistent with the affirmative plan. Colburn indicated 
that the counterplan should be "outside the intent" of 
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the affirmative plan. McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills used 
the term "inconsistent," and contended that the counter-
! 1 h . h h 1 " . 1 . n 61 p an must c as w1t t e p an on some v1ta 1ssue. 
The remaining writers indicated that the counterplan 
should be different in principle from the affirmative plan. 
Musgrave predicted that without an understanding of the 
purpose of such a rule, there would be much debate over 
what constituted a "change of principle." The purpose he 
defined was to avoid negatives adopting a counterplan that 
t . . 1 h ff. . 1 62 was oo s1rn1 ar to t e a 1rrnat1ve p an. One theorist 
advocated a concept of competitiveness based on structural, 
f t . 1 h '1 h. 1 d . . 63 A 1 ' d unc 1ona , or p 1 osop 1ca ev1at1ons. s exp a1ne 
earlier, the P.arliarnentary analogy was used to justify a 
requirement of solving a common need area. 
Lichtman and Rohrer advocated a rule based on two 
criteria for competitiveness. A counterplan was corn-
petitive if (1) plan and counterplan were mutually 
exclusive, or (2) adoption of both the counterplan and 
the plan was less desirable than adoption of the counter-
64 plane alone. This concept was criticized as repugnant. 
If negatives were allowed to claim advantages in any 
problem area, debate would be only a confusion of issues, 
and clash will be avoided in absence of a common goa1. 65 
Lichtman and Rohrer responded to these criticisms by arguing 
that their counterplan theory was less confused than tradi-
tiona! theory, that clash was defined by the relevant theory, 
and that the focus should be on policy cornparison. 66 
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Other Concepts 
A few other concepts require comment. Most of the 
writers have implied that a counterplan should be non-
topical. Only Ulrich provides any analysis. He suggests 
a problem concerning a standard of topicality of a 
counterplanr and cites three views. The standard of 
topicality for an affirmative plan is generally reason-
ableness. Some theorists have contended that a counterplan 
may be reasonably nontopical. Others argue that if an 
affirmative can prove the counterplan topical by any defini-
tion, it is topical; and finally, some require the counterplan 
to fall outside of the affirmative definitions. 
Counterplans sometimes are said to be conditional or 
hypothetical. This strategy includes a defense of the status 
quo, and suggests that if the status quo fails, the counter-
plan can solve the needs. Hypothetical counterplans usually 
adopt less than the resolution to gain the affirmative advan-
d h . f ff. . . t. f. . 67 tage, an t us pose a quest1on o a 1rmat1ve JUS 1 1cat1on. 
A recent study of judges at the National Debate Tournament 
revealed that only 15.8% of judges generally accepted the 
conditional strategy. The remaining 84.2% of the judges were 
split evenly between accepting the conditional strategy with 
reservations and generally rejecting it. One judge commented, 
"A counterplan is like death--quite a commitment. You cannot 
be a little dead, a little pregnant, or a conditional counter-
plan." 68 Other authors allow a negative to minimize the 
69 
affirmative's need and at the same time support a counterplan. 
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Summary 
A general lack of focus pervades the consideration of 
counterplan judging criteria. After a review, it can be 
stated that presumption is relatively unimportant as a 
decision tool for counterplan evaluation. Most traditional 
theorists seem to support a vague concept of negative 
abandonment of presumption. This is consistent with Richard 
Whately's conception of a presumption in favor of the status 
quo or existing institutions. Since the negative, by virtue 
of presenting a counterplan, is generally thought to be admit-
ting the need for change, they reject the status quo and its 
presumptive advantage. While systems analysis does not view 
presumption as particularly important, decision rules 
established by risk theory assign presumption based on degree 
of risk as dictated by the unique circumstances of a given 
debate. Hypothesis testing views presumption is lying 
against the resolution; thus a negative would have to support 
a propositional alternative in order to lose the advantage 
of presumption. 
With or without theoretical backing, most theorists 
reviewed considered the negative supporting a counterplan 
to assume a burden to prove their proposal superior in merit 
to the affirmative plan. An articulate minority believed 
thqt t he counterplan must be only equal to the affirmative 
plan to prevail, since the affirmative's burden required the 
affirmative plan to be proven superior to all options. 
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The most important and least clear of the criteria re-
viewed was competitiveness. A commonly accepted and logical 
rule for competitiveness was mutual exclusivity. If the 
affirmative could support adoption of the counterplan, and 
not endanger their own justification, the negative lost. 
More elusive was the concept that the counterplan must solve 
the same need as the affirmative plan. This became even more 
confusing when many theorists allowed the negative latitude 
in redefining the need area. Some writers addressed both 
standards of competitiveness, but did not make clear whether 
both were required. Finally, the counterplan must be dif-
ferent, by some standard, from the resolution. In some 
cases a counterplan may be argued hypothetically or 
conditionally. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has reviewed published counterplan theory 
as advanced by scholars interested in academic debate. The 
theoretical basis for the counterplan within traditional theory, 
systems analysis and hypothesis-testing has been examined and 
reviewed. The nature of judging criteria was identified. 
A description of the important concepts preceded a discussion 
of those concepts as criteria within counterplan theory. 
A brief analysis of some other relevant criteria was included. 
43 
The literature revealed more agreement than might be 
expected, yet no consistent theory of the counterplan can 
be identified. Future study should focus on the implica-
tions of the important concepts in actual practice, and on 
a synthesis of those concepts into a consistent theory. 
In addition, the effects of the differing decision models 
on counterplan criteria deserves more attention. Inevit-
ably theory must be determined in debate rounds. It is 
hoped that a greater awareness of theory of counterplan 
judging criteria will help to give meaning to that 
practice. 
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